"Oh. My own working conception of punishment is -
- what's the human impulse for justice fundamentally for? What is it doing for us, what kinds of worlds does it reach for? I think the answer is that you get less bad things, in the world, if it is a predictable feature of the world that if they happen they'll be punished; we execute murderers not because they have become bad and thereby begun to merit execution, but because there's less murder if that's how you handle it. In this conception, justice is Lawful - sorry - justice is ....contractualist? Justice is ....an agreement you would make before being born and ignorant of what soul you'd be born as?
...justice has its importance in the scheme of human values as an element of rules that societies agree to in order to be better societies. In the ideal, societies would make only those rules which, consistently enforced, make society better for everyone, and have those punishments which produce the best tradeoff between the rarity of rulebreaking and the harm done by punishment, and I would argue that also in the ideal world becoming subject to a justice system would be fundamentally voluntary, a condition of participation in society but an option people could meaningfully refuse if they did not agree with the tradeoffs their society was making. You can flee Axis for Elysium.
Now, justice like other parts of Law and Good is built into the human spirit, and the way it's built isn't precise like that, nothing's precise like that in the human spirit. The way it often feels to want justice is to want a bad thing to happen to a bad person, so that they'll suffer, which will be good because they are bad. It also often feels like justice to hurt people who've done no wrong, but have offended local sensibilities, or to hurt outsiders more severely for the same crimes. Human spirits - reach for the Good - but aren't perfect in finding it. And my intuition is that the desire to bring about justice, in the absence of a system to which the relevant parties were knowingly subject, is a sort of misfire, it is the impulse being imperfect at identifying the situations in which it can usefully be activated.
Because in the absence of a system to which the relevant parties were knowingly subject, it's hard to imagine how justice brings about Good. It can't prevent things that no one involved could have anticipated they'd be punished for. It can only with some distortions and some paroxysms establish a precedent that may prevent similar conduct in the future, among the people who believe already in the workings of that system.
There is something tremendously emotionally appealing about saying, 'if we hang a common murderer, how many more times should we hang an Emperor who with his words and his seal murdered hundreds of thousands? As many as it takes him to run out of diamonds.' It is a grasp for - a real thing, a true thing, the fact that most of the final violence of your world and mine is done under orders, and not by petty powerless criminals, and that most of the responsibility for it is yours and mine. But it will bring none of that violence to a halt to try to turn justice into something that it cannot be and is damaged by trying to be.
In matters where there is no preexisting system of predictable punishment which the involved parties knew of, or could have known of, my answer is that justice is not, actually, one of the tools we have to hand, and we'll have to make do with other ones. In many real cases, it will be deeply unclear which systems count and what it would've meant to know of them, and sometimes something looks sufficiently like justice that it's better to treat it as an actual justice proceeding, but - in many cases, if we find ourselves struggling to fit these intuitions to these situations, we should consider that this may be because we are trying to make justice do work it cannot.
I do think that people would ideally have a fundamental entitlement to the truth of what was done to them being known, and to decide for themselves whether to forgive it, and I think they would ideally have a fundamental entitlement to live in a place with justice processes, and for those justice processes to operate impartially with respect to wrongs done to them. But if you don't have the latter two - you should execute Emperors precisely when you expect it to make the world better, and not bother bringing justice into it."