More writing.

1) It is a crime to publicly make, aloud or in writing, a false, scandalous, or malicious claim about another person, or to clearly or intentionally imply such a claim.

2) It is a crime to privately make a false, scandalous, or malicious claim about another person, or to clearly or intentionally imply such a claim, unless the statement is true.

3) Neither of the above statutes shall apply if the claim is made directly to a person empowered to make lawful arrests, as part of a formal investigation of malfeasance, provided that the claim is true. They shall also not apply to truthful testimony at formal trials or similar proceedings, nor to the verdicts of said trials, nor to true and non-misleading statements about the findings of such trials.

4) A "scandalous or malicious" claim does not describe every possible negative claim. For example, it is not scandalous or malicious to claim that a man drinks to excess, if such a claim is true. Magistrates are directed to apply their discretion in determining whether a claim is scandalous or malicious.

5) A claim made about a group may be a violation of this statute, if such a claim clearly implicates distinct individuals and this statute would otherwise apply.

The punishment shall at minimum be a fine that in the magistrate's judgment accurately reflects lost income and standing as a result of the slander, and shall not be more than the punishment for the conduct ascribed to the victim, be it a crime, or more than exile from Cheliax, if the conduct ascribed to the victim is not a crime. In cases where a claim violating this law is made intentionally to a wide audience, or published in print to wide distribution, the magistrate should by default apply the maximum sentence, unless the claim is revoked immediately or other mitigating circumstances apply, in which case the magistrate is directed to apply his discretion.

"I don't want to exempt perjurious statements at trial. Is this revision acceptable?"

"It resolves my concern."

He looks questioningly at Lord-Marshal Cansellarion, to try to gauge whether he's likely to make a big deal out of the issue of true slanders on the floor. The Archduchess probably can't get people to vote it down by herself, everyone knows she's a radical, but Cansellarion is a reasonable man and a paladin besides.

"I would still prefer a statute that only bars falsehoods, including accidental falsehoods, to one that punishes true slanders. Perhaps you could provide some examples, of things which are true but should be punishable as slander?" In his opinion the best defense against true slanders is to not have any slanderous things be true about you.

"Truly I am loath to speak such words in this company, but I had waved in my face as I arrived at the trial a pamphlet which said of a woman, "Assuredly," and then the woman's name, "is not a whore in bed with Geryon. That was, I am sure, true."

"In that case, to let the truth of the written word stand as defense against the injurious lie of the implication would not see justice done." Felip wasn't going to bring it up directly, but he supposes that directness does make the example clearer.

"Consider also that the archduke of the Heartlands is a Thrune by name, but I do not think the public was made better off by this becoming widely known, and he was surely injured thereby. If that does not count as a slander, I am not sure what the point of a slander law is."

"Possibly a more precise term would be 'disparagement'."

"I won't say slander's ever right, but some men need to be disparaged."

"As written, the judge could take into account the truth of a statement as a mitigating factor, in cases where it is genuinely relevant— oh, Captain Sarroca, welcome. Our committee had a few questions for you, but first, I call for a vote on the proposed law against slander."

"In favor."

“Directing the magistrates to apply their discretion seems .. promising,” Vidal says slowly, “but I am unsure their enchantments allow them any discretion, even if the law grants it. If they do, though, perhaps we should include that phrase more generally.”

The magistrate in Valia’s case clearly wanted to come to a different decision, but he doesn’t know if it was the enchantment or the phrasing of the law that restrained him. 

“That said, I am in favor of it as it stands.”

"In favor."

"In favor."

"In favor."

"In favor." They do need some slander law, even if it's not the one he'd prefer.

"In favor."

"I agree with the Lord Marshal's concerns, but very well, if we're not going to vote on them. In favor."

"In favor."

What a good efficient committee. Hopefully the floor debate goes as smoothly. He's going to have to be careful which true extremely derogatory things he says about Valia Wain's allies, though.

"In favor."

"In favor. The proposal passes unanimously. I believe there were some questions for Captain Sarroca, now?"

Manel Sarroca is tall man with tanned skin and a confident stride. He walked in unescorted, wearing a coat tailored to imply but not mimic a Taldan naval uniform. 

At Jonatan’s words he steps forward and bows formally. “I am at your service, Your Excellency.”

"Lord Marshal, you have the other most relevant expertise, shall you begin or shall I?"

"Go ahead, Archduchess. You know more about being a Lord Mayor than I do."

"Thank you. Captain Sarroca, could you summarize your main methods, in Ostenso, after order was initially restored? You would not be just a guard captain, of course, but all the differences between an average guard captain and a really good one lie in that period."