She also wants to avoid digressing into the minutiae of ancient Taldane legalese. It happens much less since Aroden v. Maelstrom established once and for all that petitioners don’t have to obey literally all the laws of their home country to be considered Lawful, but it's still really annoying when it does. “Valid, though this wasn't the way to do it,” she tells Heaven. “Hell, do you have a response?”

“Whether or not the interpretation called ‘absurd’ by the counsel for Heaven was the intent of the Emperor four thousand years ago, it is the interpretation of that statute in the courts of modern Cheliax, which is what matters here—Various Undead v. Crown, 4709.”

“I am not actually bound by the precedents of mortal courts,” she reminds the devil. Especially not a court presided over by a cleric of a god she's not currently supposed to mention aloud.

“It’s dispositive on the factual question of what the law of Cheliax is in this matter. Importantly, at no time did either party make any allegation whatsoever that Asmodeus did not validly and rightfully own the soul of Cheliax,” because they would have been tortured to death if they had, “or that He had not always possessed the right to wield supreme power therein. The question before the court was whether, given this obvious and incontrovertible truth, the other parts of the statute still applied, or whether it had always been null and void in toto. If you would like to overturn that precedent, we will happily, at this point, restore a handful of liches and vampires to their petty titles of nobility.”

“Your Honor, regardless of the interpretation of this particular statute, it cannot be imagined that the law of Cheliax forbids Asmodeus from doing anything, least of all taking possession of something that someone wishes to sell Him. As was affirmed by Cheliax’s own Court of Queen’s Bench in Crown v. Church of Iomedae, 4666, ‘The supreme law of Cheliax is the law of Asmodeus,’ and the law of Asmodeus is that He is already the rightful master of all Creation.”

“Very well. The objection by Hell is sustained. Heaven, do you have anything further to add on the matter of whether Hell was competent to purchase the soul of Cheliax?”

“If Asmodeus is already the rightful master of all Creation, how is it meaningful to sell Him anything?”

“Overruled; obviously Asmodeus is not actually the master of Creation. The question at hand is only whether Cheliax believes so.”

“Nothing further, then, Your Honor.”

“Plaintiff, you may proceed.”

“Thank you, Your Honor. The next question this court must consider is whether the sale of the soul of Cheliax was legal according to established regulations on the soul trade. Nirvana v. Hell, -12201 establishes a number of tests for whether the sale of a soul is legitimate. The first is whether the decision to sell is meaningfully the seller’s own. We affirm that Abrogail Thrune was of lawful age and sound mind according to the standards of her own culture, and under no enchantment, compulsion, or curse, at the time she signed her contract with us. Heaven disputes none of this; they certainly had no plans to contest the custody of Abrogail’s own soul when her mortal life ends.”

“Objection: unfounded speculation.”

“Sustained. Does Heaven in fact dispute the claims just made by the counsel for Hell?”

“Yes, Your Honor.”

“They can dispute it, if they like,” says the devil. “It does not matter. They can claim that Abrogail Thrune is young, that she was unwise, that she will predictably regret her actions. They would even be correct. This does not matter. What matters is whether this court would declare Abrogail Thrune irresponsible for the sale of the two souls which were hers to sell, a notion which is, when one considers some of the other cases that have appeared before this court, utterly laughable. Infernal Cheliax executes fifth-circle wizards who refuse to sell their souls; this was ruled not to invalidate the sales because, quote, ‘the coercion applied did not constitute a decision-theoretic threat as that term is defined in the Statute and Charter of the Alliance to Preserve Creation, -202436 A.R.’—Abarco & al. v. Hell, 4691. Notably, Abrogail Thrune was not even coerced—oh, she wouldn’t have survived refusing to sell her own soul, but selling the soul of Cheliax was her idea. Hell was skeptical at first. I have transcripts.”

“Heaven disputes that she could validly sell a soul. Of course they do; they have never once admitted that anyone could. That is why I ask, rather, whether Heaven would actually consider it worth the expenditure of its resources to make this argument if it were only Abrogail’s own soul on the line. ‘One may only claim to want what one is willing to pay for’—Order of Numbers 6:13. I think Abadar would know.”

“Objection: random quotes from holy books are not precedent.”

“I don’t think he was claiming it to be. He has, in fact, a point. If you don’t think Ms. Thrune was incapable of making the sale for some reason not already rejected by the court in any of the millions of soul-sale appeals we’ve heard over the millenia, I’m not really inclined to relitigate any of those. Did Heaven in fact intend to file an appeal for Ms. Thrune?”

“I wouldn’t expect to know whether we did or didn’t. Personally speaking, I would represent her if she asked me to.”

“Do you have any specific argument that you expect the court hasn't already ruled out?”

“No, Your Honor.”

“We may proceed, then, to the question of whether the price paid by Hell was fair. We do not, actually, expect the defendant to object to the magnitude of the price—at least, not that it was too small, which is the only direction of error that can legally invalidate a sale. Rather, we expect the defendant to object to the fact that the price was paid in a form and manner which ipso facto benefited Hell, even before we received anything in exchange for it. We maintain that this is entirely legal; indeed, that there is no other way we could have done it. Any price paid to the seller, even of a more ordinary soul, is necessarily an investment in what is thereafter Hell’s property. This was no different from a payment of permanent Arcane Sight to a wizard who then uses it in Hell’s service, which was held legitimate in the Abarco case. There is, indeed, no test Heaven can propose by which to overturn the sale of this soul which would not also overturn every sale made in Cheliax since the ascendancy of the House of Thrune.”

“How about we do that, then?”

“Objection, out of order,” says the devil with a melodramatic sigh.

“It's Heaven’s turn to speak,” says the judge. “Counselor, do you wish to let Ser Cansellarion give Heaven’s rebuttal?”

“We’d like to see where he’s going with this.”

“Very well, proceed.”