[Author's note: After discussion with some readers where they kindly pointed out several flaws in this system, I no longer think this is how it works in the Fixipelago. The overall goals of the system from above remain unchanged, but the specific price-discovery and payment mechanisms are no longer a solution I endorse.]
"Cool! So almost all prices for things that go towards UBI are set using Vickrey auctions. The idea is that you want an auction structure that incentivizes people to say what their real price is -- if people put in bids lower than what they're really willing to pay for something, then if somebody else wins the auction they'll regret it, because they would have been willing to pay more. If someone puts in a bid higher than they're willing to pay, that's no good either, because then they might lose more value than they gain, and why would anyone participate in a system like that?"
"So the trick is to find an auction structure where everyone's best chance to win is to put in a bid for whatever the item is really worth to them, without distortions. One way to do that is to have everyone who is competing for something put in a sealed bid. Whoever put in the highest bid wins, but they only have to pay the amount of the second highest bid. This has a few nice properties!"
"For one thing, it means if you're the only one bidding, you don't have to pay. Or in other words, if you want something that nobody else wants, you can just have it without needing to compensate anyone. It also means that there's no reason to systematically underbid your real price -- lowering your bid doesn't save you money, it just means there's more of a chance of losing out to someone else."
Her tone of voice has gotten increasingly excited as she explains. Economics is really fun.
"And that works pretty well for one-time purchases. But for something like renting a house, there are other things people care about beyond just getting a particular house -- like being able to predict when they'll need to move, or being able to just live for a while without worrying about auctions. We could hold all the auctions periodically -- like once a year -- and some towns actually do that. But that means that new people can't get a house without waiting for the auction to come around, among other problems."
"Fortunately, this is a problem that can be solved with insurance! What you can do is run the auctions very frequently, so it's easy for people to enter and exit the market on their own schedules, but provide auction insurance. Instead of paying a variable price in every single auction, and having to worry about losing them or not being able to budget, you pay a (slightly higher) flat rate across the whole duration to buy auction insurance from an insurance company. In exchange, they promise to pay however much it takes (up to a given limit) to win the auction for you."
"So the actual experience is -- you find a house you want, and say how much you would be willing to pay for it. If that's enough, you get it. If it isn't enough, you at least increase costs for the person who is using the house instead, get paid slightly more, and have a chance at winning the bid when the current occupant's term of insurance runs out. Nobody pays more than a space is worth to them, there's no need for a centralized schedule, landlords can't collude to raise prices, everyone can set how long they want to rent for, and prices are mostly stabilized by insurance."
She realizes that she's been monologuing and coughs into her fist again.
"It's not a perfect system -- sometimes it can be hard to get into a neighborhood that becomes popular very suddenly, for any price -- but it works fairly well for most things. There are places where it works differently; the community as a whole pays for the entire area, and then subdivides it according to their own rules. But that's the usual system."