This theory obviously does not compress all of the evidence available to them that looks like it ought to be compressible.

In particular, Golarion's past weirdness such as might be pleasing to the Makers, seems different in character from the strangeness of past-Keltham landing where he'd end up with multiple romantic prospects.  Though he hasn't been staring too directly at that, himself, because it seems like it might also have been a Cayden Cailean tactic to arrange some of that tropiness; he knew that future-augmented-Carissa would be able to think about that more safely than himself, if it needed thinking about.

But it's an obvious thought that the Negatively-Caring Entity that sent past-Keltham into Golarion might've split the cost with something that had strange preferences about isekai stories, so long as they were arranging an isekai at all... or something.

He does not, in fact, expect to succeed in decoding what actually went on there at his current level of augmentation.

But depending on the size of the Makers' causally-connected local section of their Higher Universe, in terms of how many different Entities are active traders there, there could be something in there that erupted out of a civilization that got stuck in some weird equilibrium where it poured more and more resources into an increasingly sophisticated interactive isekai romance.  Say, because that civilization was even worse than Golarion at handling existential threats like the Worldwound; and the interactive romance novel succeeded in being a romantic superstimulus to the species' members, and was therefore an extremely selfish-profitable investment of computation, and they managed to pour billions of labor-hours into that company, but not into the public good of surviving their own transcendence.  That level of coordination failure would've seemed implausible to him before Golarion, but now he buys that as a plausible dysfunction mode for aliens.

The resulting Entity which ate that civilization, then cared a lot about having isekais look more like romance novels.

(It's more likely that one such Isekai Entity exists within causal contact of the Makers of the Magical Continuum, if there's a lot of Entities in mutual causal contact with the Makers, but this doesn't seem implausible.  The kind of computations the Makers are throwing around do not seem characteristic of three-dimensional space with a tight lightspeed limit.)

The Isekai Entity might care more about 'natural' versions of those events than those it arranged for itself, due to having evolved some earlier taste for the natural, or a prohibition against tickling its own rewards (as its makers might have tried and not-totally-failed to imbue into it).  Or it could be a Negatively-Skewed+Caring-Entity, which made for itself quintillions of the cheapest events it classified as isekais, but would still be very unhappy about any isekai-categorized event occurring anywhere that wasn't a correctly designed romance novel.

The Isekai Entity would of course refuse to pay to modify isekai events that were planned only as threats to itself.  But the original Negative Entity's paid intervention into Golarion would have been an isekai purely of that Negative Entity's own natural interests; it would not have started as an isekai only for purposes of threat.  So the Isekais-Must-Be-Romances-Entity paid to further modify those events - paid a lot, because it wouldn't run across naturally-occurring isekais in need of fixing very often, and would have a lot of generalized money to spend on that.

He realizes it's not a good theory.  He's just keeping it in mind so that he has a probably-false theory he can use to organize his evidence, and at least notice when something contradicts or confirms that theory, rather than leaving his observations wholly unorganized and untheorized.

It's a very Keltham theory. She agrees that it's not a good theory. While it does seem to her like Keltham-related events have a distinct character from the events of Golarion's history, that feels mostly-fully explained by Cayden and Nethys's meddling plus the degree to which a legend out of history gets distorted by the retelling.

She's less sure than Keltham that Greater Reality isn't mostly local, entities creating their own universes that run by their rules. It doesn't seem like a natural thing, after all, to care about things happening in other universes; it feels like resolving a muddle in a particular way where you might expect most people not to. (What's Keltham's theory on why entities would care about things outside themselves, in general, anyway, or at least why humans do it?)

He doesn't stare too hard at Cayden/Nethys, so that's Carissa's future job if it produces relevant factors.  He was trying to reason mainly from Pilar's, Carissa's, and Asmodia's prior improbability in their base characters before any divine meddling started.  He's reasoning from the improbability of Pilar's potential for tropian stories, rather than the Cayden-meddling realization of that potential.

Caring about everything everywhere that matches a pattern is computationally simpler than caring about only things that match the pattern in a particular region of space; also, if you only care about a short time in the future, somebody will trade you a small amount of resources today for all of your resources later, which eliminates you as a lasting Power of Reality.  Or:  Caring about 'experiences' of the 'self' requires defining 'self', and if that definition cuts off all strong growth and self-modification, that entity is again filtered away as a strong Power of Reality.  Or:  Things that get optimized into existence by something like natural selection, which is trying to solve a problem in an environment, may well end up caring about something in the environment; or rather being made up of a muddle that could easily shake out that way for at least some things.  (That's how it happened for humans, leaving out some complexities of reflection-towards-coherence along the way.)

There's nothing forcing an agent to shake out that way, but it is simple to care about every part of reality by running your utilityfunction over its configuration, and if a component of many humans' values lands there, then plausibly so do a bunch of other things' components.

Even if Reality did end as mostly Entities that were mostly Locally-Caring, the non-Local Entities would still trade with each other; trade-optimized regions would then just be a smaller total fraction of Greater Reality's dispensation of its intelligently controlled realityfluid.

Carissa agrees that something probably not-Cayden put Pilar there as well as Carissa; Asmodia feels less suspicious, to Carissa, as a person, Asmodia seems like the kind of person lots of people are. …except that maybe someone had to be a person who'd say to Carissa that they wanted to not exist, so that she could understand that as something a person might actually want for themself and not just want inflicted on others, so that she wouldn't report Keltham to Asmodeus the instant she realized that his plan might destroy the world. 

She understands that natural selection produces muddles which can then shake out in many many ways that aren't what created an advantage in the selected environment, and probably other processes for producing intelligent beings - breeding them deliberately? - would do the same thing. It still seems like there are powerful forces in the direction of caring about yourself and your family and your nation and your species more than you care about all sapients; she expects most evolved creatures not to care about everybody, though tentatively.

Asmodia was oddly adept at learning the more mathematical parts of Law, for somebody to just happen to be in the same class as Pilar.  The second group, sent over when Cheliax assigned the project a higher priority and was trying to allocate smarter people instead of gift-girls, didn't seem to contain another Asmodia.

Lots and lots of evolved things, and probably even more of the Entities that the evolved-beings birth (if they mess it up) would end up not caring about sentient beings at all, whether Locally or Everywhere.  The categorization he's suggesting generalizes beyond caring about sentients, for example:

Suppose some being cares a lot about particular shapes of matter, for example, and prefers matter being curled up in one squiggle shape - a rounded-rectangular spiral pattern say - while greatly wishing that no pattern ever be squiggled up in a hyperbolic spiral.  It might feel no pain or pleasure, no joy or happiness, about the fact; it might just act so as to bring about the rounded-rectangular squiggles, and avoid the hyperbolic spirals.  Or it might feel pain or pleasure internally, as it learns about spirals or squiggles being created, but be indifferent to this as it plots its goals.

From the perspective of the Squiggle-Caring Entity, some other Entity that cares a lot about people having conscious experiences is then just a strange being that cares about some weird and more abstract and complicated pattern that matter can be squiggled into.

Playing out some additional particulars in case the abstract pattern didn't make it across the telepathic gap at the speed they're trying to think at each other:

That Entity would be categorized as Negative-skewed or Positive-skewed in that utterly sentient-uncaring utility function, depending on whether one ill-shaped squiggle pattern cancels out the utility of 100 good squiggles or 0.01 good squiggles.

A Negatively-Skewed Squiggle Entity, whose utility function arose in any way suggesting that this utility function arises more often in Greater Reality than its (Positive) inverse, has incentive to be signatory to a compact whereby the Future of dath ilan's Civilization would spend lots of resources to intervene, if Future-Civilization ran across some smaller thing that also really hated hyperbolic spirals, and some mid-sized Pessimizing Entity was therefore making lots of hyperbolic spirals because it had decided to pessimize the smaller agent's utility (maybe after making a threat that was decision-theoretically-properly refused, and having evolved to be hateful itself).

Future-Civilization wouldn't care about hyperbolic spirals as such, and the smaller thing might not be a kind of being that experienced unhappiness as such, or had even chosen to have any conscious experiences at all.  But in return, the original larger Squiggle Entity would intervene if it saw somebody torturing a mortal; not because it cared, not even because the mortal was trading with it, but because Future-Civilization had agreed to avert the pessimization of Negatively-Skewed Entities in general, conditional on its expectation that a lot of Negatively-Skewed Entities would do the same, and Entities signatory to that compact were expected to occasionally avert small or large squiggle-caring beings from being pessimized by having lots of hyperbolic spirals created at them.

A logical trade like that comes with friction costs.  So Negatively-Skewed Entities are more likely to be signatory to a pact like that than Positively-Skewed Entities; because even if they only assess a 10% chance of Future-Civilization actually existing to execute the bargain that they predict Future-Civilization to execute if it exists, and even if they expect Future-Civilization to underestimate by a factor of 10 how much the Negatively-Skewed Squiggle-Carer exists to pay them back, it's still worth sacrificing the opportunity cost of 100 rounded-rectangle squiggles to prevent one expected hyperbolic spiral from being made.  A Positively-Skewed Squiggle-Carer would conversely demand 100 units of realityfluid be spent on preventing hyperbolic spirals in order to justify sacrificing 1 unit of realityfluid that could have been spent directly on rounded-rectangular squiggles.

She doesn't want to invest too much in contemplating how as a god she'd handle that problem, when it's a probably-wrong model Keltham sketched out and probably not a description of actual reality. But it is the bleakest possible imagining of the universe, that it's mostly full of entities who'd consider the universe not existing to be among the best possible outcomes, who are set up structurally such that almost everything that could possibly happen is bad and all the good things are worth losing to slightly reduce the chance of bad ones. 

Pharasma and the winning god-coalition destroyed the gods that sided with Rovagug, and she would do the same thing to entities that would side with Rovagug, if she could.

(Probably in some universes Rovagug and the gods that sided with Him won and everything got eaten, and she's not in those universes because they don't exist, and she understands how that counts as triumph for some people, how they might just want to peel more and more Golarions away from the branch where people live and die and love and fight and laugh and cry and squeeze them dead and make the "Golarions eaten" branch of the tree a little thicker. But it's not what she wants.)

Negatively-Skewed Universal Carers don't need to end up wishing that somebody would erase their universes!  Unless they really hate the way that reachable matter is shaped by default, compared to it not existing; but hopefully such beings are few... or configured in such a way that they're not experiencing constant suffering about that; he himself wouldn't want them to be unhappy, though it's not like they themselves need care about "unhappiness".

So long as Reality isn't allowed to end up full of Zon-Kuthons and Asmodeuses and other such utilityfunction pessimizers, most Entities, even Negatively-Skewed ones, could mostly be getting things they want, and not things they hate.

People who feel like Reality loses more when one person gets crushed and tortured, than when ten people lead happy lives, aren't necessarily out to destroy Reality.  If no one is being tortured, there isn't a problem!  (Or rather, if nobody reachable is being tortured, there isn't a problem you can solve by destroying the local universe, and you might as well not think about it or be sad about it either.)

Civilization would have fought to defend itself from destruction, and did fight to defend itself - because while there were possible states of matter that would lose more (compared to a null state of lifeless matter) than the best states of matter would gain, they managed to stop those bad things from happening, and be mostly happy.

That's the grand dream and vision, from the Negative standpoint - that Reality not contain a lot of utilityfunction pessimizers running around and occasionally pessimizing beings with utilityfunctions similar to their own, so that Reality as a whole is something they're still glad to have around.

That's why Pharasma is being given an out.  She doesn't need to have Her Creation destroyed, if She's willing to have it not contain such a large element of utilityfunction pessimization.

That did actually occur to Carissa, or something like it, when she first decided not to betray Keltham and to come to him instead.

She thinks she may have made an error there, but -

- but it seemed to her that Golarion would not, really, endure for the forever she wanted for it, while it had Hell in it, that even if she warned them and they crushed Keltham there would be another like him someday, that the only way for Golarion to endure forever, like she wants it to, was for it to be something large shares of reality didn't want to destroy.

She understood a thing Keltham said on her first day here as a claim that this wasn't true, that he didn't think he was extending Golarion's lifespan in expectation. But - with caution about the mind-states that permit her to help him without being a threat to Pharasma - she does, actually, strongly value the destruction of Hell for that reason and think some substantial risk of destroying the world would be warranted, though by her own preference you'd spend decades exploring other Hell-conquest options first.

It's not a consolation he feels honesty-safe and epistemically-safe about offering her.  That Hell has been allowed to persist this long within Creation (on those hypotheses where all of this is as real as themselves, and not quantitatively much less real than that) is evidence (within those hypotheses) that intervening in Creation is expensive; and only became some combination of affordable+attractive after the death of Aroden lost other hopes, or the shattering of prophecy made it less expensive to act against gods.  It is possible that if this intervention against Pharasma fails, no other will be sent.

Decades seems like quite an unreasonable amount of time for smart people to think.  He'd take that time only if there was sufficient value-of-info; and he didn't expect to slip up, tip off the gods, and get squished, inside of that delay.

It does seem clear enough to him what he is sent here to do.  He's not happy about it; he's a lot less happy about Hell.

Carissa is largely resigned to the fact he is going to try it.  She wants to convince him that only Hell is worth doing it for, and that if he gets Hell but Pharasma is unable or unwilling to change any other things about Creation, then that should be sufficient for him not to prefer the world destroyed. She hopes to narrow the specification further: figure out the actual minimum ask and make sure it's a concession Pharasma can grant if She wants to.

She sees that Keltham isn't going to be willing to not try to destroy the universe. She hates him for this, on some level, but she doesn't predict anything different.

He is, in fact, presently minded to demand of Pharasma that protections be set up to make sure this doesn't happen again.  Among the reasons why he would hesitate to simply press a button and destroy only Hell and Asmodeus, if he could come up with a scheme that he was sufficiently convinced would do that on a first try, is that Pharasma might just build a new Hell, and then take Zon-Kuthon out of the vault and put Him in charge of neo-Hell.

The problem from his perspective is not just Creation as it stands being horrible, but that Creation has no rails against becoming even more horrible in the future if he solves the present horribleness.  It may not be a way that people in Golarion are accustomed to thinking, who have so many problems today that need to be solved right now, but dath ilani try to put systems into states where they will knowably not go bad later instead of just being okay right now.

If Creation isn't knowably on a trajectory that takes it permanently out of being a miserable hellhole, it unfortunately seems to him that his utilityfunction strongly suggests smashing the whole place and letting sentient beings exist elsewhere instead, and the present inhabitants likewise having futures that continue mainly elsewhere.

He's not sure why (earlier?) Carissa expects/expected their continuations to be awful.  His model of Outer Gods and Entities is that the ones which don't care about people will mainly not use matter in a way that involves it being people.

Even the Makers of the Magical Continuum, which very likely don't care about people, aren't taking all of the matter and realityfluid in the Magical Continuum and turning it into unhappy people.  Past-Keltham, possibly, got sent to Golarion because it was a particular kind of intervention that was cheaper to buy from the Makers than anything more sensible; he was not put someplace that would hurt him as much as possible.

He doesn't think that Entities with simulating-eyes on Pharasma's Creation, or who trade with the Makers of the Magical Continuum for information from it, that care about the sentients within it at all, would be trying to continue the people there past the end of Pharasma's Creation with a goal of hurting them.  The ones who care about continuations at all, he would hope, are themselves nice; or trading with Entities that are, in the sum of their goals and auction bids, nice.  If that's not so, he's substantially more peeved with whatever hypothetical Entities sent him here to destroy Creation, and also it seems less probable that caring Entities would want that of him in the first place.

That he is sent here, who will deliver an ultimatum to Pharasma to improve living conditions or be destroyed, is some evidence that he wouldn't have been sent here if the expected result of destroying Creation were to isekai everyone here to worse-than-Hell.  Though of course, the Entities that sent him here could be acting deceptive about that, expecting himself, or Pharasma, to be deceived by the apparent evidence of Their actions.

Safeguards against this ever happening again definitely need to exist, but if they can be negotiated without Pharasma, say among the other gods, then that's preferable to making them part of the Pharasma-ultimatum.  If future disasters are sufficiently unlikely then Creation shouldn't be destroyed just because its laws don't prohibit them, after all dath ilan's laws don't prohibit it either.

She's hoping they can negotiate around what 'sufficiently unlikely' means. For one thing, she thinks Pharasma wouldn't, actually, create another Hell and put Zon-Kuthon in charge of it; that would be a change on a scale that hasn't happened and might not even be possible and that would serve the interests of no existing non-Zon-Kuthon gods and not be consistent with what Pharasma is known to care about. Perhaps Iomedae or Erecura can give better estimates of its plausibility, but it'd be good to know how much implausibility is sufficient for Keltham.

Let him be considered an alien wandering by who sees a lot of matter in an unpleasant state, that can with some work be converted to a more pleasant state of nonexistence.  He's already put in some work to destroy the universe, and made some serious sacrifices about that.

Then, after all that work, some other alien steps in and requests his indulgence to instead transform reality into a different end state which that alien likes better than nonexistence.

He's not especially interested in calculating the exact least pleasant most miserable state he considers better than nonexistence, so that other alien can make him an exact minimum offer that gives him a near-zero tiny fraction of the gains from coordination.

If they're going to be revising Creation anyways, how about if Pharasma comes up with a decent offer that doesn't resemble a hellhole so much anymore, and gets something that She herself considers comfortably better than nonexistence, a state that neither of the two of them consider really icky and unpleasant; and everybody lives happily ever after, except for Zon-Kuthon who ought to be turned back into Dou-Bral anyways.

Because that involves him being willing to destroy some universes that don't have Hell and have an incredibly low probability of ever having Hell, and he shouldn't be willing to do that because it's an awful thing to do to people without even Hell as justification?

She can feel herself having to stamp on the impulse to get emotional again, but it's that answer, rather than the original plan, that is why she hates Keltham and wants to preemptively cryopreserve dath ilan, the fact that he is willing to destroy the world if it is offered the end of Hell. It is that which feels to her like a mad monstrous incomprehensible blankness, like murder for its own sake.

The fact that Carissa feels that way might get him to accept an offer of 4, in this Ultimatum Game, but not an offer of 0.01.

If Pharasma says 'well, I can declare that the Lawful authority over Hell is Carissa, and I predict with very high confidence that I won't change who is the Lawful authority over Hell again in the next billion years, but nothing else you want is the kind of thing I really do as an entity', then Keltham should not consider it accepting an offer of 0.01, to bring hope and comfort and healing to every single person in Hell and never have it again and have everyone else in the universe go on with their good and wonderful lives.

And if Pharasma says 'well, well, I can declare that the Lawful authority over Hell is Carissa, and I predict with very high confidence that I won't change who is the Lawful authority over Hell again in the next billion years, and the other things are also things I could do, but I won't, because I don't want to', and Keltham murders every single person in the universe over that - he can't hide behind Hell, if he does that. He wouldn't be doing that because of Hell. He would be killing trillions of people and sending at least some of them to Hell, because some of Greater Reality is bad, because he personally doesn't like the deal he got.

She doesn't have a purer definition of what Evil is than destroying a universe in which trillions of people live and none are in Hell, because you feel that this universe doesn't give you a big enough share of the benefits of it existing.

No matter how high the stakes are, if you're willing to accept tiny shares of gains from trade, you won't get offered any other deals; that logic doesn't change when the stakes go up.

It seems to her that Keltham is not just rejecting the trade Pharasma offers him, of living in her universe, as not worth it to him, which he may totally do if he likes; but is also going around smashing every trade Pharasma has offered every other person, which they ought to have the right to accept or reject on their own, and rejecting all those trades on behalf of all those people.

If putting Carissa in command of Hell is change enough that Golarion, and every other planet in its plane, and every plane in the rest of Creation, can with that much of a boost, see higher technology and greater cooperation spread from star to star, until people here are no longer living squalid lives where half their children end up in the Boneyard, that then indeed would be enough.  That would be a fair chunk of trade-gain; it wouldn't be the minimum quality of life and maximum misery that got him to be almost indifferent toward this reality's destruction.

Similarly, if universal education got to the point where everybody could actually understand the choice made in deciding to leave Creation for Greater Reality, and it was easy for them to skip the afterlife system if they wanted, he would be okay with that.  But that sounds like Civilization rising to great enough heights that it'd be fine regardless; even a mildly below-average dath ilani might have a hard time grasping Greater Reality shit.  It sounds like a stronger demand to make of Pharasma than just cleaning up Creation's regular mess.

Else if putting Carissa in charge of Hell is change enough that Abaddon can be subdued, and the nearby surface layers of the Abyss subdued, once Heaven and Hell are fighting there side-by-side; if cooperation between Heaven and Hell is enough divine agreement that heroes can stride from plane to plane and smash the slave-pits and torture-chambers, until rulers and parliaments learn what worst of human behavior will earn extraplanar missions of disruption -

- then he might be persuadable to consider accepting a world where people live in squalor for a few decades and go to a moderately pleasant afterlife for a few millennia or eons, until Creation reaches its natural endpoint and those people end up somewhere properly transhumanist where they can grow up for real.  So long as they're not in agony.

It would be a poor meaning to Carissa's life, he does think, if Creation could have become something greater and more exalted than that, but he for love of Carissa did abide by her last plea to accept less.  Does she ask of him to accept Creation's stagnation, in preference to its nonexistence, for fear that Pharasma won't be willing to give more?  It seems sad, to him, for Creation has the potential to be so much more than a breeding ground for souls in a handful of moderately pleasurable afterlives.  He's not sure he'll agree, if Carissa's last request of him is that he permit Creation to wallow in mediocrity and never become itself forever, as that pleases Pharasma; not even as her last request.  But she could ask, and perhaps he would accede, and then Pharasma would not be likely to offer any more.

If Keltham's demands of Pharasma are more, and farther outside the domains in which Pharasma is accustomed to functioning such as who she names the lawful ruler of Hell, then it is likelier that the universe will be destroyed and all within it lost.

It is also likelier that there will be good things it will be much harder, perhaps impossible, for Creation to attain.

But it is one thing to destroy a universe because it is bad, because there are those in it who cry out to die and cannot, and another thing entirely to destroy a universe because it is good but there are goods it does not possess; it would be a fine and joyous and great meaning to Carissa's life, if what she does is convince Kelthams not to annihilate any universes that do not have Hell in them, to save all the trillions of people in all of those universes, and then to devote her eternity to building the greatest and best thing that can be built within creation, which will, she thinks, be pretty great.  It doesn't seem sad to her, because Heaven doesn't seem sad to her, and Elysium doesn't seem sad to her, and Nirvana doesn't seem sad to her, and of course if she's in charge she bets she can do even better. What seems sad to her is for all that all those places are or could have been to be lost forever.

She is skeptical, in the end, that Pharasma can change the fundamental nature of everything about creation, in a way that she is not skeptical that Pharasma can change who is in charge of those afterlives that acknowledge Pharasma's authority to decide that. She thinks it's quite unlikely, and that demanding it of Pharasma almost definitely means everything is destroyed forever. Reasoning with trope-logic, she thinks this might be the thing she is here to say to Keltham, the thing all the careful maneuvering was about: not that a universe with Hell in it is worth existing, because she was never going to convince him of that, but that a universe without Hell in it is worth existing.

(Everyone in it can of course be told about Greater Reality, and destroy themselves if they want to take their chances with it. She predicts that they overwhelmingly won't.)

There should have been more mortalborn gods in this world than Irori, if Irori was possible at all, and it is suspicious to him that neither Nex nor Geb tried to attain divinity.

There should have been trade between stars, if the Outer Planes are connected to all of them, if spells like Interplanetary Teleport are a thing.

Golarion should have attained higher technology, earlier, when +6 intelligence headbands are a thing here; the steam engine should not have needed to wait on the shattering of prophecy.

If Pharasma can't directly help mortals, not even by giving Her priests a contraception spell that some other god designed, then so be it.  He hadn't meant to demand impossibilities of Her, if impossibilities they are, as his minimum gain from trade.

But he strongly suspects that there are measures set in place to prevent mortals from rising, to prohibit mortals from developing into gods even if they naturally would, to prohibit trade between stars and planes.

And whether those measures were born of pacts between ancient gods, or laid down by Pharasma, he had meant to demand, whether of Pharasma or of those ancient gods, that mortals be permitted to rise according to whatever fire is in them, and not be pressed down.  He's not, by his own nature, inclined to tolerate a reserve where mortals are kept as livestock and not for their own good either, even if those livestock are just ordinarily miserable rather than in agony.

Oh, Carissa's definitely planning on building Civilization, if any of Golarion survives to build it on, and they can send some 'arks' out for other worlds, if (as looks likely) Golarion doesn't. It's why she was initially prioritizing Golarion in her planning, the part which wasn't about partiality to her homeworld - she thinks that the place where prophecy is broken is the place where they should be most sure they can build Civilization whether Pharasma approves or not.

Thinking something isn't worth destroying the universe to achieve doesn't mean thinking it isn't very important, or worth making many many other costly sacrifices to attain. 

They could go grab some people in Axis and in Heaven and in Elysium and Nirvana and explain Greater Reality to them and see what they think; Carissa predicts that they will largely not consider themselves livestock, and will be generally very happy about their lives and long-term trajectories, and will likely prefer to keep existing, and she will rethink some things if that turns out false. She'd be really surprised if you can't tell people about Greater Reality in the afterlives, even if you can't tell them while they're mortals.

It's not that she doesn't think that everyone who wants to become a god should have the chance to rise that way. She absolutely thinks that. She means her Hell to be a place where everyone becomes the greatest thing that they can be. She just thinks - and she suspects that Keltham, too, if he's studied the question, will think - that a universe where everyone just goes to nice afterlives and it's rare for them to become a god is better than that universe not existing. She also thinks Keltham will think that at least enough of Greater Reality is nasty that he'd be sending some unlucky share of them to Hell so that some others of them could become gods, which is a trade that doesn't seem very Kelthamish.